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RECENT CASES
AERIAL LAw--RIGHT TO INVADE THE AIRSPACE ABOVE PRIVATELY OWNED
LAN--Airplanes, in taling off and landing upon a private airport, were forced
at times to pass over land adjacent thereto, at an altitude of one hundred feet.
The owner of the land sought injunctive relief against such repeated flights as
trespasses the continuance of which created a nuisance. Held, that it was a
trespass to pass over the plaintiff's land at such an altitude, but; in the absence
of proof of actual harm to the plaintiff or interference with his use of the land,
an injunction would not issue. Smith v. Aircraft Co. et al., decided by Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, U. S. Aviation Magazine, (Supp. U. S. Daily,
March 22, ig3o) at 3.
The right of landowners in the airspace above their land was early described
in the maxim, "cuius solumr est, eius est usque ad coelum".' In all the cases
in which this common law maxim was sought to be applied, however, the right
actually asserted and recognized by the courts was a right to the uninterrupted
use of the airspace so far as the owner could reasonably use it.' The recent
enactment of federal' and state' aerial legislation, the former based on the
interstate commerce clause of the Constitution,5 the latter upon the theory of
the power of a sovereignty to control the airspace above its territories,' con-
stituted a recognition of the principal that the ownership of private property is
subject to an easement of passage at a height which will not interfere with the
12 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Lewis ed.) I8; COKE ON LrrrTL-ox
(Butler and Hargrave ed.) §4a; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (I92o) 864.2 Hannabalson v. Sessions, 1I6 Iowa 457, 9o N. W. 93 (1902) (thrusting
arm into space above land) ; Whittaker v. Stangvick, lOO Minn. 386, 111 N. W.
295 (19o7) (shooting over another's land); Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. L R.
io C. P. io (Eng. 1874) (horse kicking over another's land); Puorto v.
Chieppa, 78 Conn. 4Ol, 62 Ati. 664 (9o5) (board projecting over another's
land); Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716 (i9O6) (wire
stretched across another's land), etc.
'W. J. DAvrs, AERONAUTIcAL LAW (1930) Chapters V-VI, in which is
discussed the Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926, making it legal to fly above
the minimum height fixed by the Secretary of Commerce, namely five hundred
feet.
, Ibd. Chapters VII-VIII, which reviews state legislation on the subject,
similar in effect to federal legislation, except for differences in the minimum
fixed. Special reference is made to the UNIFORM STATE LAW FOR AERONAUTIcS,
which has been adopted by the following states: Delaware, Idaho, Indiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and Vermont. Further discussion may be found in R. W. FIXE., LAW OF
AVIATION, (1927); G. B. LOGAN, AIRcRAFT LAW MADE PLAIN, (1928).
'Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3, see (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 663.
6 W. J. DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL LAW, op. cit. smpra note 3, c. VII.
(902)
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owner's peaceful enjoyment of the land flown over.7 But such a limitation upon
the right of a landowner to maintain an action of trespass for the invasion of
the air above his land is essentially an attack upon the common law maxim
above,' unless that maxim, as has been often suggested,9 is not to be taken
literally. There has, however, been no judicial decision directly defining just
how high the landowner's right extended at common law." The principal case
comes nearer to such a definition than any American case so far. It is dis-
appointing as a final determination of the problem, however, inasmuch as the
plaintiff bases his claim only upon an invasion at an altitude of one hundred
feet and within the usable airspace, but fails to put in issue the question whether
flight above the five hundred feet fixed as the minimum for lawful flying by
statute, would constitute an actionable wrong. The result of the case is, there-
fore, merely that flight within the usable airspace is a trespass for which
nominal damages could be recovered at law. To reach this result it was not
necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the statutes permitting flight at
a fixed minimum height. The court discussed the point nevertheless, justifying
federal legislation as proper under the interstate commerce clause, and state
legislation under the police power. The necessary inference from such an effort
at justification, that the court found a taking of property rights for which an
excuse was needed, is hardly consistent with the express words of the court
to the effect that these statutes "do not authorize the taking of private rights." "
In short, the principal case neither directly decides nor dearly declares in its
dictum what is the true extent of the landowner's right. Its real importance lies
in the fact that it strongly indicates the attitude of the courts favoring the
present trend in aerial legislation."
Ibid. 28. That this principle has already been recognized in other countries
was pointed out in (1922) 71 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 88, which referred to (I) the
British Air Navigation Act, I92O, § 9 (1), providing that "no action shall lie
in respect of trespass . . . by reason of the flight of aircraft over any property
at a height above the ground which is reasonable"; (2) the German Imperial
Code of 1goo, § 9o5, providing that "the right of the owner of a piece of land
extends to the space above the surface . . . The owner may not, however,
forbid interference which takes place at such a height . . . that he has no
interest in its prevention." Such legislation is to be distinguished from that
dealing with invasion of the airspace which results in actual damage: A. L. New-
man, Danage Liability ii- Aircraft Cases, (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. lO39.
'It has been suggested that if the maxim gives a right indefinitely upward
into the airspace, such statutes violate the due process clause so that the
progress of air navigation is possible only with a constitutional amendment.
Others insist however that the common law gave no more than a right in the
usable airspace, W. J. DAvis, AERONAUTICAL LAW, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 32;
G. B. LOGAN, AIRCRAFT LAW MADE PLAIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2o.
'Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Tel. Co. (1884) L. R. 13, Q. B.
D. 9o4, in which the court termed it "another fanciful phrase"; Pickering v.
Rudd (1815) I Starkie (Eng.) 56; Johnson v. Curtiss N. W. Airplane Co.,
Minn. Dist Ct. 1923. Docket p. 2696; POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS (8th ed.) 348.
" See cases supra note 2, none of which involved an invason above the
usable airspace.
"U. S. Aviation Magazine (Supp. U. S. Daily, March 22, 193o) at 9.
' Supra note 8.
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AGENCY-TRrA,--VERDICw AGAINST MASTER ALONE IN AcrioN AGAINST
BOTH MASTER AND SERVANT-The plaintiff was struck by an automobile driven
by an agent of the owner on the owner's business. A joint action was brought
against both the owner (the principal) and the driver (the agent). At the
trial, a verdict was rendered against the owner only. The owner then appealed
on the ground that the verdict holding him liable and relieving his agent of
liability was inconsistent. Held, that this was no ground for setting aside the
verdict. Bentett v. Eagleke et al., 148 At. 197 (N. J. 193o).
There is a conflict of authority on the question of whether the judgment
should be reversed in a case where, injuries having been effected by the negligence
of the servant, an action is brought against both the master and the servant but
a verdict is rendered against the master alone. The great weight of authority
adopts the view that the judgment should be reversed The reasoning of the
courts adhering to this view is that the master is liable only on the doctrine of
respondeat superior and if the verdict relieves the servant from liability, it is
equivalent to a finding that there was no negligence on the part of the servant
and therefore it would be contradictory to render a judgmefit against the
master.2 Also if the verdict releases the servant, the master's right to recover
over against the servant would be lost 3 The principal case is in accord with
the minority view' which holds that the master and servant are joint tort-
feasors and therefore a judgment may be rendered against either or both of
them. This holding is also sometimes placed on the ground that the plaintiff
is entitled to the judgment given him by the jury and he alone may be aggrieved
for the failure to get a judgment against the servant, but the master has no
grievance.0 In the principal case the verdict was silent as to the servant, in
'New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U. S. 18, 12 Sup. Ct. jog (1891);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122, 68 S. E. 1103 (1910); McGinnis v.
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 200 Mo. 347, 98 S. W. 590 (19o6). So also if
an action against the master and servant is based solely on the theory of
respondeat superior and the court directs a verdict for the servant, it is error
to submit the negligence of the master to the jury, Kansas City Ry. Co. v.
Leuch, 6o Okla. i, 158 Pac. 1146 (1916).
'McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I & Pac. Ry. Co., ibid. at 362, 8 S. W. at 594;
Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, (190).
'Loveman Co. v. Bayless, 128 Tenn. 3o, 315, 16o S. W. 841, 843 (1913);
Jones v. Southern R. R. Co., io6 S. C. 20, 90 S. E. 183 (igi6) (verdict against
railroad company alone was held illogical in an action against it and three of
its freight agents for damages caused by the bite of a vicious cat).
'Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 123 Ky. 789, 97 S. W. 729 (Igo6); De
Sandro v. Missoula Light & Water Co., 48 Mont. 226, 136 Pac. 711 (1913);
Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream Co., 1O3 N. J. L. 427, 135 Atl. 886 (1927).
r Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Murphy, ibid; Whitesell v. Joplin & P. Ry. Co.
et al., 115 Kan. 53, 222 Pac. 133 (1924). For a case in which a statute was
involved which provided that one of several appellants shall not be entitled to
a reversal because of error in the judgment against another not affecting his
rights in the case, see St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Sanderson, 99 Miss. 148,
54 So. 885 (1911).
'Weil v. Hagan, 166 Ky. 750, 179 S. W. 835 (915); Texas & P. R. R.
Co. v. Huber, 95 S. W. 568, 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o6): "Although such a
verdict has the appearance of being based on inconsistent and contradictory
findings of the jury, this is not of itself enough to require the reversal of the
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which case the minority view is that this is to be considered as though the
case had never been tried against the servant and therefore the master still
has whatever rights he previously had against the servant.7 These cases are not
to be confused with those in which there is other negligence than that of the
defendant servant, either on the part of the master or on the part of other ser-
vants.' In these cases a verdict for the servant never exonerates the master.8
But it is difficult to see, in a case like the instant one, where the only possible
means of rendering a judgment against the master is through the negligence
of the servant, how the judgment against the master can stand if the verdict
also establishes that the servant was not negligent.
CoNFLiCr OF LAws-ARmrrATlox AND AwARD-WAVER OF PERSONAL SER-
VICE OF PROCESs-A contract to sell goods, made in New York, provided for
arbitration in England pursuant to the provisions of the English arbitration law.
A dispute having arisen under the contract, the plaintiff in England, acting
under the English Arbitration Act,' caused written notice of the appointment
of an arbitrator by an English court and of the date fixed for his hearing to be
served on the defendants who were in New York. The defendants owned no
property in England and they were American citizens domiciled in New York.
When the defendants failed to appear at the arbitration proceeding in England,
an award was made in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff sues in a New York
court to recover the amount of the award. Held, that the English arbitration
award cannot be enforced in a New York court. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 135 Misc.
305, 237 N. Y. Supp. 171( 1929).
A general rule provides that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents
so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within
the state rendering the judgment.2 It is also frequently stated that parties to a
contract may agree in advance to waive such personal service of process, thereby
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court in which the controversy
subsequently arises? However, difficulties develop in determining just when
judgment against the passive defendant, the reason being that the finding in
favor of the defendant whose acts constitute the negligence complained of,
and the finding against the other, in the same case, by the same jury can be
attributed to improper conduct of the jury, in arbitrarily exonerating the
former, and not necessarily to a finding that there was no negligence on his
part."
7 Verlinda v. Stone & W. Engineering Corp., 44 Mont. 223, 119 Pac. 573
(9i1I) holding that the failure of the jury to find as to the servant is to be
regarded as no finding at all as to him; Melzner v. Raven Copper Co., 47
Mont. 35I, 132 Pac. 552 (1913). But cf. Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N. Y.
228, 105 N. E. 423 (1914).
8Finley v. Southern R. R. Co., 5 Ga. App. 722, 64 S. E. 312 (1908);
Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Lee, 227 Ill. 246, 81 N. E. 411 (1907); Clay
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 104 Minn. i, 115 N. W. 949 (1908).
152 Vict. c. 49 (1889).
2 Grubel v. Nassauer, 21o U. S. 149, 28 Sup. Ct. 684 (1913) ; McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917).
'GooDarCH, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1927) 140.
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and under what circumstances a party defendant may be said to have waived
personal service. Thus, the mere acceptance of a bill of exchange payable in a
foreign country, is not a waiver of personal service from the courts of that
country.' Similarly, an arbitration agreement, mentioning the law of no
specific country, can hardly confer jurisdiction of the person upon the courts
of any one foreign nation.' Hence, it would seem that inasmuch as the'party
setting up waiver of personal service has the burden of taking the case out
of the general rule requiring actual personal service, he must show an express
submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.' In this connection it is
important to distinguish between an agreement to be bound by the substantive
law of a foreign nation and an agreement to submit to its rules of procedure.7
In the principal case, there was no express waiver of personal service, and the
English Arbitration Act, while providing for notice of the arbitration proceed-
ings,' made no specific mention nor exemption of personal service of process.
Therefore, it would seem that although the defendants consented to be bound
by the substantive law of England, they did not by the terms of the arbitration
agreement waive the general requirement of personal service.' Since the
English courts had never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defend-
ants, the New York court properly refused to enforce the arbitration award.
"Kerr v. Tagliavia, ioi Misc. 614 (1917), aff'd 186 App. Div. 893 (1918),
appeal dismissed 229 N. Y. 542 (1920), certiorari denied 254 U. S. 645 (1920).
Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 202 (1929).
'Mere ownership of shares of stock in a foreign corporation does not give
the foreign court personal jurisdiction over that owner in a winding up proceed-
ing, Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Wis. 224, 178 N. W. 735 (920); cf.
Copin v. Adamson, L. R. 9 Ex. 345 (Eng. 1874). A judgment note, authorizing
confession of judgment by an attorney of any court of record, is a clear illus-
tration of an express waiver of personal service, Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N. J.
459, 75 Atl. 903 (i91O).
'Consent to be bound by the rules of a foreign court has been held to
amount to express waiver of personal service, Feyerick v. Hubbard, 71 K. B. 5o9
(i9o2) ; Sturges v. Unit Construction Co., 207 I1. App. 74 (1917) ; cf. Mitsu-
bishi Goshi Kaisha v. Carstens, 116 Wash. 63o, 200 Pac. 327 (1921).
'Supra note I. Ordinarily, notice under arbitration proceedings is not
the same as service of process, Sturgess v. Unit Construction Co., supra note
6; see Rasch & Co. v. Wulfert [19o4] I K. B. 11S, 12.
'English rules of court do not allow service of process upon non-resident
parties to an arbitration agreement, DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1927)
864. However, such' rules of court cannot bring the defendant within the
personal jurisdiction of the English courts unless he has agreed to be bound
by such rules.
'0 While it may be argued that consent to be bound by the substantive law
of a foreign state amounts to an implied consent to be bound by its procedural
law, it seems more logical to demand an express consent to personal jurisdiction.
Some authorities, when discussing the essentials of a technical submission to an
arbitration act, distinguish actual submission to personal jurisdiction from a
mere contractual obligation to so submit, see Rasch & Co. v. Wulfert, szpra note
8, at 122.
a'In its opinion the court also points out that an arbitration award is not
exactly the same as a judgment, although such award is capable of being turned
into a judgment, I HALSaURY, LAws OF ENGLAND (1907) 473.
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CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAv-COURTS-DELARATORY JUDGMENT Acr-Lessor and
Lessee disagreed as to interpretation of their lease, lessee claiming the right
to rebuild the property. Lessor threatened forfeiture if such rebuilding com-
menced. Acting under the Michigan Declaratory Judgment Act,' lessee asked
the court for construction of the lease and an injunction against interference
by the lessor with rebuilding. Defendant demurred. Held, that the Act was
constitutional. Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore. Decided by Michi-
gan Supreme Court, U. S. Daily, Mar. ii, ig3o, at 88.
At common law, an action at law lay only to redress a wrong committed
before the action was brought. Equity, however, might enjoin threatened wrongs
and might entertain bills quid thmet. Statutory provision has frequently given
the courts wider power, e. g., to quiet title to land, to construe wills, and to give
directions to trustees.2 Under the civil law, and in modem England, there has
been the broadest recognition of the desirability of enabling the parties to know
their legal rights before damage is done.' In the United States, seventeen
jurisdictions have enacted legislation with a similar purpose, almost half of
them adopting the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.' None of the present
statutes contemplate the decision of moot or academic questions, but require
the existence of an actual controversy. So interpreted, these acts are constitu-
tional.5 The judgment sought may be either of the affirmative or negative
type,' the latter denying the existence of the right in question. In either case,
the judgment is res adjudicate. Hence, all the interested parties must be
'MICH. PUB. ACTS No. 36, 1929.
2 A. W. Scott, Progress of the Law-Civil Procedure (I919) 33 Hnv.
L. REV. 236, 253.
'Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform(1918) 28 YALE L. J. I, 105. (Discussion of the civil law: pp. 1O-24; discussion
of the English law: pp. 25-29.) The influence of the English statutory pro-visions is apparent in the various American acts. For the advantages ofdeclaratory judgments, see Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judgment (1917) x6 MICHr. L, REv. 69. For statement ofthe possible dangers it creates, see Krach, The Declaratory Judgment Laws inView of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927) 13 VA. L. REG. (N. s) 141.
'CAL. CODES OF CiV. PROC. (Deering 1923) § 1o6o; Ky. LAWS I922, c. 83;N. Y. Civ. PRoc. AcT (1921) § 473; 1923 P. L. 840, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928)
§ 28o5a.
'Blakeslee v. Wilson, i9o Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923) ; State v. Grove,
lO9 Kan. 61g, 2Ol Pac. 821 (1921); Board of Education v. Van Zandt, 119
Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (I922), aff'd 234 N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481
(1923) ; Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925). Anway v. Grand
Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (192o), generally cited as the solecontrary adjudication, is distinguished in the principal case on the ground that
the statute there interpreted did provide for the decision of moot questions.
The construction of the Act in the Anway case is squarely in conflict withother decisions and has been criticized. Its result wag avoided in the statuteconstrued in the instant case by the insertion of the following provision: "Sec 6.Declarations of rights made under this act shall have the effect of final judg-
ments."
' Borchard, op. cit. stpra note 3.
T Revis v. Daugherty, 215 Ky. 823, 287 S. W. 28 (1926) ; Kariher's Petition,
supra note 5.
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before the court' Ordinarily the court will refuse a declaration which can be
made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts, especially where the
disputed questions of fact will be subject to judicial investigation in a regular
action? Nor will the case be entertained if no consequential relief is asked
and the effect of a judgment would be to interfere with the rights of a party
to appeal to a court having jurisdiction of the particular matter by statute'0
It is to be regretted that the usefulness of the declaratory judgment has ap-
parently been somewhat curtailed by the refusal of federal courts to take similar
jurisdiction, a view based on the theory that this is not a "case' or "contro-
versy" within the meaning of the Constitution." Unanimous state interpretation
suggests a contrary conclusion.'
CORPORATIONs-DISREGARDING CORPORATE ENTITY--ONE MAN CORPORA-
TIONs-The decedent, in her will, directed that the indebtedness of her nephew
be cancelled. The nephew did not owe the decedent any money, but a corpora-
tion, of whose stock he was sole owner, did. Held, that the debt of the cor-
poration was cancelled by the will. Fidelity Trust Co. et al. v. Servjice Laundry
Co. et al., 2 S. W. (2d) 6 (Tenn. 1929).
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from
its shareholders is elementary in corporation law.' In a grtat number of cases,
however, the courts have qualified this by saying that the concept of a corpora-
tion as a legal entity is only a fiction adopted for convenience in the transaction
of the business of the corporation and is to be disregarded when the facts war-
rant holding the corporation liable for the acts of the shareholders, or the
shareholders liable for acts ostensibly done in the name of the corporation.' So
the distinction between the corporation and its shareholders has not availed to
protect either against liability for the acts of the other when the corporate
'Revis v. Daugherty, mupra note 7.
9Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn. 3o2, 278 S. W. s6 (1925).
The exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary with the court, and where no
consequential relief is sought, it will be exercised only where special circum-
stances demand it, Kariher's Petition, supra note 5; Greene v. Holbrook, 128
Misc. 769, 22o N. Y. Supp. I5I (1927).
o Shearer v. Backer, 207 Ky. 455, 269 S. W. 543 (1925) ; Wight v. Board
of Education, 99 N. J. Eq. 843, 133 At. 387 (1926) ; Kariher's Petition, supra
note 5.
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927),
discussed in Krach, op. cit. supra note 3; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (1928).
Cases cited supra note 5.
'Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267, 28 Sup. Ct. 288
(1908); Cummings v. Peo, 211 Ill. 392, 71 N. E. 1o3i (i9o4); Rhawn v.
Edgehill Furnace Co., 201 Pa. 637, 51 At. 36o (i9o2).
'McCaskill Co. v. U. S. 216 U. S. 504, 30 Sup. Ct. 386 (i91o) ; Wise
Realty Co. v. Stewart, 169 Cal. 176, 146 Pac. 534 (1914) ; Chicago etc. R. R. v.
Miller, 91 Mich. 166, 5 N. W. 981 (1892) ; Anthony v. Amer. Glucose Co., 146
N. Y. 407, 41 N. E. 23 (1895) ; Kendall v. Klappuerthal Co., 2o2 Pa. 596, 52
At!. 92 (i9o2).
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form was used to perpetrate a fraud ' or illegal act,4 or to evade a statutory or
contract obligation," or when the corporation was the mere agent of instru-
mentality of the shareholders.0 It is submitted that the basis of these decisions
is not the fact that the entity of a corporation is a convenient fiction, though
this is the reason commonly advanced by the courts. The separate entity of a
corporation is a reality and not a fiction.' Indeed the very purpose of the charter
is to secure for the corporators the privilege of acting in a capacity separate
and distinct from the capacities of the individual shareholders. Practically all
the cases where the courts have said they would disregard the entity of the
corporation as a fiction, may be explained by the application of the ordinary
principles of agency, estoppel, or joint participation in fraud!" A few cases
have held, however, that the mere fact that the stock was owned by one person
was sufficient reason to disregard the entity of the corporation,' and it is among
these that the principal case must be placed upon its facts. There was no
reason to consider the debt of the corporation the same thing as the debt of the
nephew except the fact that he was the sole owner of its stock. Such a holding
is contrary to the decided weight of authority "o and is indefensible whether we
consider a corporation's separate entity a reality or a fiction, since in either
case its identity should not be confused with that of its shareholders except
where the statutory privilege of a separate corporate capacity has been per-
verted from its legitimate purposes.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoMMrrMENT To INSANE AsYLuM-PRsoN INSANE AT
TrIME OF COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE BUT Now SANE-A statute provided
that when insanity is relied on as a defense, a commission should be appointed
by the court to inquire into the mental status of the accused at the time the
offense was committed and at the time of trial. Under such statute, a commis-
sion appointed to ascertain the mental status of defendant found that defendant
'Ii re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, I905) ; Booth v. Bunce,
33 N. Y. 139 (1865) ; First Nat. Bank v. Trebein, 15 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834
(898).
'U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (19o5) ; State
v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 3o N. E. 279 (1892).
"Higgins v. Cal. Petroleum & Asphalt Co. et al., 147 Cal. 363, 81 Pac. Io7o
(19o5) ; Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (9o5).
In. re Watertown Paper Co., 168 Fed. 252 (199o).
7 It has been pointed out that while the separate entity of a corporation is
real, corporate personality is a fiction, CARTER, THE CORPORATION AS A LEGAL
ENTITY (1919); Albert W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (igio) 24
HARv. L. REV. 253, 347.
'There is no reason why a corporation may not be a separate entity and
yet be the agent of its shareholders, or privy to a fraud of its shareholders.
'Bank of Gadsden v. Winchester, Iig Ala. 168, 24 So. 35 (19o8) ; Swift v.
Smith Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 AtI. 534 (1886).
" Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 2o3 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193
(I98); Commonwealth v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 216 Pa. io8, 64 Atl. I909
(19o6); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118Atl. 279 (19zz).
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was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, but was now sane.
Under the statute, it was for the court to decide whether such person be com-
mitted to the insane asylum. Held, inter alia, that the action of the court in
sending such person to an insane asylum was justified and that defendant could
be confined for a reasonable time. State v. Burns, 125 So. 580 (La. 193o).
The instant case presents a rather novel problem in the administration of
criminal law. It has long been established that insanity at the time of arraign-
ment, before or during the trial and before sentence, bars further criminal
proceedings at that time and furnishes grounds for the commitment of such
person to an asylum until such time as sanity shall be restored1 Moreover,
a finding that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the
act relieves him of legal responsibility and precludes punishment for such act.'
But where it is established by a proper tribunal' that the accused, although
he was insane when he committed the act, has now been restored to sanity, on
what basis can his commitment to an asylum be justified? Certainly it cannot
be justified "because he has committed a crime, for the jury (in the instant
case, a commission appointed by the court)' by their verdict have negatived
this; not for the purpose of treatment, because by hypothesis, he is not insane."'
Despite the seeming anomaly in this situation, by statutes in some states 6 and by
decisions of courts in others, such commitments have been upheld.' The reason
assigned by the courts is that, having once been insane and committed a criminal
act, the likelihood of the recurrence of such insanity justifies the commitment
of such person as a menace to society. By statute, it is for the jury in some
states, and for the court in others, to determine whether there is such a likeli-
hood as to justify such commitment; ' but regardless of whether it is for the
court or for the jury to determine this, it seems that a most illogical and anoma-
lous result is reached. Moreover, among the decisions and statutes there
'BIsHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §396a; Com. v. Scovern,
292 Pa. 26, 29, 14o Atl. 611, 612 (1928) ; Fralick v. State, 25 Ariz. 4, 212 Pac.
377 (1923) ; (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 999.2 "Since the criminal intent is an indispensable element in every crime, a
person mentally incapable of entertaining such intent cannot incur legal guilte,
BisHop, op. cit. snitpra note I, at 223. An exception must be made to the general
rule in the case of those crimes, sometimes called "public torts", which require
no necessary mental element. See Keedy, Insanity and Criminal ResponsiNlity
(1911) 2 JOUR. Calm. LAW AND CRIMIN. 521.
' In some states, the "proper tribunal" is the "jury", in others the "cour?',
and in others a "commission" appointed by the court. See discussion in (1928)
76 U. OF PA. L. RZv. 999.
'Parentheses our own.
Keedy, op. cit. supra note, 2 at 531.
6TRIAL OF LuNATics AcT, (1883) 46 and 47 Vict. c. 38 (b), 2 (1). Statutes
in U. S. on subject are collected in article on Insanity and Criminal Responsibil-
ity, supra note 2, at 530.
'State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, 262 Pac. 970 (X928) ; People v. Lee, 275
Pac. 815 (Cal. 1929) ; Gleason v. West Boylston, 136 Mass. 489 (1884) ; Brown
v. Urquhart, 139 Fed. 846, 849 (W. D. Wash. 19o).
'Bonfanti v. State, 2 Minn. 123 (1858) ; Gleason v. West Boylston, supra
note 6.
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seems to be a wide divergence of opinion both as to the length of time' and
the place "o of such confinement. The better view would seem to be that where
it has been found that the accused was sane at the time of the commission of
the offence but is now insane, he should be committed for the purposes of treat-
ment until his sanity shall have been restored, so that he can safeguard his
rights at trial; that where he is found to have been insane at time of the act,
and is now insane, he should be committed, for although legally irresponsible
for the act and not punishable, yet to safeguard society he must be committed;
but where he is found to have been insane at the time of the commission of the
offence, but is now sane, he should be discharged.
DAMAGEs-TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPEHs-LAILITy FOR FAILURE To FUR-
NISH PROPER MEANS OF COMmUNiCATIN-Plaintiff, a flour merchant, entered
into a contract for sale of flour, with the provision that the contract become
effective if he did not notify the buyer to the contrary within a certain time.
Price of flour rose and plaintiff, having frequently employed the defendant's
telephone line and in placing his calls having always requested promptness,
placed a long-distance call to buyer to cancel the contract within the time
limited for notification. Defendant failed to complete call and plaintiff was
compelled to perform contract and thus suffered loss. Held, that plaintiff was
only entitled to nominal damages since he had not notified defendant of nature
and purpose of call, or that he would suffer special damages if it was not
promptly completed. Southwest Telephoite Co. v. Carter, decided by Arkansas
Sup. Ct, U. S. Daily, March 18, 193o, at 168.
It is usual, when considering the problem of the liability of telephone and
telegraph companies for negligence in providing means of communication, to
preface such discussion by mentioning the oft-quoted decision of Hadley v.
Baxendale.1 The court in that case established the doctrine that one who
commits a breach of contract will not be liable for unusual consequences not
within the contemplation of the parties, unless the special circumstances likely
to cause extraordinary damages were communicated to the party charged with
the breach. The applicability of this rule to the liability of these public utility
companies providing facilities for communication is evident inasmuch as the
relationship between these companies and those employing them is ordinarily
contractual. The general rule, therefore, is that a telephone or telegraph com-
pany will be liable for negligence in furnishing communication only to the
extent of nominal damages,2 unless the company received notice sufficiently sug-
'Excellent discussion of this is to be found in Note (I9o6) I L. R. A.
(N. s.) 546.
"Ibid.; Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. I (1875) (to state prison hospital);
Reg. v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525 548, 549 (i84o) (to prison) ; Rex v. Little,
Russ, 7 R. C. C. 430 (to jail) (182i): Com. v. Merriam, 7 Mass. 168 (i8IO)
(to house of correction) ; State v. Burris, supra page 58i (to insane asylum);
State v. Saffron, supra note 6 (to insane asylum).
19 Ex. 341 (Eng. 1854).
'Usually amount paid for use of facilities, 3 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) § 879.
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gesting the probability of special damages and the consequent necessity for
preventing its occurrence.3 The problem arises in the determination of what
constitutes "sufficient notice". Where notice is imparted by the patron directly
to an agent of the company, then it is clear that liability for special damages
will result.4 Confusion, however, exists in telegraph cases in the determination
of whether or not from the very contents of the message there is knowledge
of such facts as to indicate the nature and importance of the message and
necessity for prbper transmission. Where the message is in cipher,
5 it is
generally held that although cipher messages usually indicate importance, yet
such fact alone is insufficient to evidence the fact of the likelihood of unusual
damages.' There is also a conflict of opinion where the message manifests the
communication of a commercial or business transaction and that loss will prob-
ably result if the message is not delivered promptly, in which case it is held
by a majority of the courts that liability for special damages will arise even
though the extent of loss is not communicated. In telephone cases, as in the
principal case, it is clear that the only possible method of giving sufficient notice
is by actual express communication by the subscriber to the operator and where
such is not done then no liability for special damage should result
EQUITY-DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY-CONDITIONAL DECREE WHERE PLAIN-
TIFF'S SERVICES ARE OTHERWISE UNENFORCEABLE-Defendant corporation manu-
factures staples and stapling machines. Plaintiff sells specialties. On March I,
1923, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was to be
defendant's sole distributor. Plaintiff agreed to use its best endeavors to sell
defendant's devices, and not to sell any other make of staples or stapling
'Southern Telephone Co. v. King, 1O3 Ark. 16o, 146 S. W. 489 (1912);
Faulkner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 13 S. W. (2d) xo88 (Mo. 1929);
JONES, TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS (2d ed. 1916) §533; Clay, Liability of
Telephone Company (1914) 1 VA. L. REv. 337, 339; Wolf, Liability of Tele-
graph Companies (19o3) 51 Ai. L. REG. 715.
'Information that telegram is important is insufficient to charge company
with special damages, Fitch v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 150 Mo. App. 159,
130 S. W. 47 (1910).
"A 'cipher' is ordinarily taken to mean a secret or disguised written com-
munication unintelligible to one without a key," Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Fish, 148 Md. 21o, 216, 129 At]. 14, 16 (ig5).
'Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. I, 14 Sup. Ct. 1098
(1894); Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 245 N. Y.
284, 157 N. E. 14o (1927) ; JONES, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 536; 3 SUTHER-
LAND, DAMAGES (4 th ed. 1916) § 959. Contra: American-Union Telegraph Co.
v. Daugherty, 89 Ala. 191, 7 So. 66o (1889); Dodd Grocery -o. v. Postal
Telegraph Cable Co., 112 Ga. 685, 37 S. E. 981 (igoo); Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Eubanks, ioo Ky. 6O, 38 S. W. io68 (1897).
Shawnee Milling Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., IOI Kan. 307, 166 Pac.
443 (1917); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Fish, supra note 5; Bailey v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 227 Pa. 522, 76 Ati. 736 (1910) ; 3 SUTHERLAND,
op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 969, 970; see (1913) 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 57.
Contra: Beaupre v. Pacific & Atlantic Telegraph Co., 21 Minn. 155 (1874);
Stone v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 35 R. I. 510, 87 AtI. 319 (1913).
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machines. On July 17, 1929, defendant notified plaintiff it would rescind the
contract Plaintiff sought and obtained a preliminary injunctibn. Held, that
the injunction should not have issued. Smart v. Boston Wire Stitcher Co., 148
AUt. 803 (R. I., 193o).
The equitable doctrine of mutuality has undergone considerable variation
since its origin' and even today there is no general accord as to its meaning or
application.2 The earlier "mutuality of remedy" doctrine, as stated by Fry,' is
that equity will not grant specific performance to the plaintiff, unless the de-
fendant, at the time the contract was made, could have specifically enforced the
plaintiff's promise. This doctrine has today been replaced by the view that
mutuality exists if at the time of the filing of the bill by plaintiff, both parties
would be entitled to specific performance.' The latter "mutuality of remedy"
doctrine operates in two ways: (I) Equity will deny specific performance to
the plaintiff if the defendant could not because of the unenforceability of the
plaintiff's promise obtain specific performance; (2) Equity will grant specific
performance to the plaintiff if the defendant would be entitled to specific
performance. This doctrine has been severely criticized as being illogical
and immoral.' Specific performance is, in the eyes of equity, a remedy,
which if practicable, is to be granted only if there is lacking an adequate
legal remedy; but if the latter is available, it is considered .that the
equitable remedy is unnecessary. It is therefore illogical to give plaintiff a
remedy which he does not need solely because the remedy is available to defend-
ant, who, in fact, needs it; and it is both illogical and immoral to deny plaintiff
a remedy because defendant, who does not need it, would be denied the remedy.
Furthermore, there are at least eight exceptions to the mutuality of remedy rule,
and therefore a more equitable and logical rule has been advocated of late
years, namely, the doctrine of "mutuality of security." ' This doctrine holds
that mutuality is satisfied where the equitable remedy, or an adequate legal
remedy, is available to both parties, or where the court, by a conditional decree,
'The doctrine was first stated by Sir John Leach in Flight v. Boland,
4 Russ. 298 (1828).
- For a discussion of the several doctrines and cases illustrative thereof see
Lewis, Mutuality in Specific Performance (19o3) 42 U. OF PA. L. REV. 591;
Ames, Mutuality in, Specific Performance (1903) 3 Coi. L. REv. I; Stone, The
Mutuality Rule (1916) 16 Cot. L. REv. 443; Clark, Is There a Positive Rule
of Mutuality? (1917) 31 HAv. L. Rxv. 271.
3 FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (6th ed. 1921) § 460.
'See Lewis; Ames; both supra note 2.
r Philbrick, (i92o) 15 ILL. L. REv. 132; Schofield, (19o7) I Ii.L. L. REV.
549; Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248, 9 Atl. 626 (1887) ; Epstein v. Gluckin,
233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
'See Ames, supra note 2, at I, 2; PO&EROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
CONTRACrS (3d ed. 1926) § 167 et seq.
'Schofield, s;prea note 5, at 550. The true basis for the rule, as stated by
Cardozo, J. in Epstein v. Gluckin, mpra note 5, at 491, 135 N. E. at 862, is:
"What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the
decree, if rendered, will operate without oppression either to plaintiff or
defendant."
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may secure mutual performance! Hence plaintiff will not be granted specific
performance if an adequate legal remedy exists even though defendant would
be entitled to specific performance. Further, plaintiff may, if practicable, secure
specific performance of defendant's obligation even though plaintiff's promise is
unenforceable, wherever equity may, by making plaintiff's performance a
condition precedent to defendant's performance, secure the rights of both parties,
or wherever there is available to defendant an adequate legal remedy. The
"mutuality of remedy" doctrine judged by the language of the courts, seems to
be the majority rule, but many of the decisions would be the same under
the "mutuality of security" rule.' The instant case, in addition to the ques-
tion of which rule of mutuality shall be adopted, seems to depend on whether
"best endeavors" may be determined and enforced. Granting that equity will not
enforce "best endeavors" because of inherent difficulties, no reason exists why
a chancellor may not, even, as a jury, determine whether such a standard of
performance has been fulfilled. It is submitted that a conditional decree pro-
viding that defendant shall use no distributor other than plaintiff so long as
plaintiff uses its best endeavors to sell defendant's devices would enforce the
contractual obligations and rights of both parties. The dangers of constant
supervision feared by the court are largely theoretical since defendant's economic
self-interest, and plaintiff's fear of rescission, would compel real and substantial
performance. However, if the court found that plaintiff had not used its
"best endeavors" in the past, or did not intend to perform honestly in the
future, the decree, since it lies entirely within the discretion of the court, would
properly be denied.
LiFE INsuRANcE-RI sK AssuMED--INcoNTEsTABLE CLAUSEs-Insurance
Company sought permission to attach a rider to its policies providing that
"Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of air- craft, except
as a farepaying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this policy; but, if the
insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service, travel or
flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this policy." The
New York statute provides that policies shall be incontestable after two years
except for non-payment of premiums and for the violation of any conditions
relating to military or naval service.' Held, that the two are consistent and per-
'Smith, J. in Eckstein v. Gluckin, supra note 5, at 250, 9 Ad. at 627: "The
mutuality required is that which is necessary for creating a contract enforceable
on both sides in some manner, but not necessarily enforceable on both sides by
specific performance."
8 Zelleken v. Lynch, 8o Kan. 746, io4 Pac. 563 (1909) ; Great Lakes Trans-
portation Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 6o3 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917).
" See, for example, Ten Eyck v. Manning, 52 N. J. Eq. 47, 27 Adt. goo
(1893).
"Plaintiff was permitted, under the contract, to sell other specialties, which
might in fact, prove more profitable than defendant's devices. Hence plaintiff's
self-interest, unlike that of defendant's, cannot be relied on to compel whole-
hearted performance.
'N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAws (Cum. Supp. 1924) c. 28, p. 1154.
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mission to attach the ?ider must be given. Metropolitan Life 1n-surance Co. v.
Conway, Superintendent of itmirance, 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 (193o).
Judge Cardozo, in writing the opinion in the instant cases, clearly drew the
distinction between an insurance company contesting a claim on the ground that
the policy is not valid and enforceable, and one defendig a claim on the ground
that death was caused by a risk not covered.' In the first situation, the com-
pany is attempting to establish the fact that the policy is invalid because of
fraud or the like in its inception. It is "contesting" the policy. Such contests
are of course barred by the expiration of the time set in an incontestable clause
in a statute or in the policy.3 In the second situation, however, the company is
not "contesting" the policy; it is, in fact, trying to enforce the terms of the
policy by showing that it did not cover death caused by certain means. It is
common for policies to except certain risks in this way as, for in-
stance, death from certain diseases,' or from residing in prohibited dis-
tricts,' or from unauthorized occupation,' or from military or naval
serviceT or from intemperance,8 or while in the violation of law, or from
suicide,"0 or at the hands of justice." If the insurance company is defending
a claim on the ground that death was caused by one of these excepted risks, an
v Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., io F. (2d) 143 (C. C. A. 5th,
1925) ; Flannagan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C.
A. 4 th, 1927) ; Wright v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. of Phila., 25 F. (2d) 514
(E. D. S. C.).
'Priest v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 11g Kan. 23, 237 Pac. 938 (1925);
Fairchild v. Union Life Ins. Co., 196 Ill. App. 7 (1915); Lawler v. Home Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 59 Pa. Super. 409 (1915) ; Reagan v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (9o5) holds that it is against public policy to have
the policy incontestable for fraud from the date of issuance; 5 COOL=v, BRIEFS
ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) 4485.
'Railway Mail Ass'n v. Johnson, 14o Ark. 289, 215 S. W. 682 (1919);
Knights & Ladies of Columbia Ins. Order v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E. 738
(19o6); Bankers' Union of the World v. Mixon, 74 Neb. 36, 1O3 N. W. lO49
(9o) ; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. King, 137 Tenn. 685, 195 S. W. 585 (1917).
'Bateman v. Grand Fraternity, 18 Pa. Super. 385 (190).
'Swanbrough v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 66 Colo. 384, I81
Pae. 204 (1919) ; Fraternal Aid Ass'n v. Hitchcock, 121 Ill. App. 402 (1905) ;
Moore v. Citizens' Mut Life Ass'n, 75 Hun 262, 26 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (1894).
'Marks v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 191 Ky. 385, 230 S. W. 540 (1921) ;
Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310 (1919);
Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (192o) ; see, in
the principal case, Judge Cardozo's discussion on military service.
'Curtis v. Modern Woodmen, 159 Wis. 303, 15o N. W. 417 (1915). Death
caused by wood alcohol does not fall within the exception for wood alcohol is
a poison not an intoxicating liquor, Modern Woodmen of America v. Lawson,
Iio Va. 81, 65 S. E. 509 (1909).
'N. C. Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 38 Ga. App. 78, 143 S. E. 449 (1928).
'0 Woodberry v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 129 Misc. 365, 221 N. Y. Supp.
357 (1927), modified in 223 App. Div. 272, 227 N. Y. Supp. 699 (1928) ; Scales
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., I55 Tenn. 412, 295 S. W. 58 (1927).
'Scarborough v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482 (1916)
(No provision in the insurance policy, decided on public policy). Contra:
Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (19o8). For
exclusion of risk in general, see 6 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5164 et seq.
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incontestable clause is not applicable, for, as stated above the company is in fact
enforcing the terms of the policy. Many cases adopt this view,- although
some courts have very curiously held that the excepted risk is excepted only
for the life of the incontestable clause and that after the expiration of the
time in the clause the defense is no longer available to the insurance company.'
Clearly the former view is correct.
NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF LANDOWNER TOWARD CONSTANT TRESPASSERS UPON
LImITFD AREA-The plaintiff, eighteen years old, entered the defendant's un-
fenced premises to see an unplugged oil well which the defendant had abandoned;
the well, thirty or forty yards from the roadway, was constantly examined by
passersby. The plaintiff hurled rocks down the shaft, and, to see their journey,
lighted the end of a strand of rope and lowered it down the Well. Held, in an
action to recover for the resulting injuries, that the defendant was liable.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Witcher, 284 Pac. 297 (Okla. 193o).
The court discussed three possible theories of recovery in reaching its
conclusion: (i) the statute' providing for the plugging of abandoned oil wells
was not a mere conservation measure, but was intended to protect the public
generally; (2) if said statute did not impose a public duty upon the defendant,
he was nevertheless liable to a trespasser for such wanton omission; (3) though
the "attractive nuisance" doctrine is not directly applicable, a child trespasser
may recover without proving that he was attracted from the highway. A statute
governing the conduct of a possessor of land may be designed to protect all those
lawfully present or only a particular class of those lawfully present,3 or its
scope may include all members of the public.' The sole issue being the legislative.
intention manifested in the statute, i. e., its purpose in view of the evils sought
to be remedied thereby, each case turns upon its own peculiar circumstances; the
court in the principal case appears to have concluded logically that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a statutory duty. But whether the statute was intended to
guard against the particular hazard of the principal case-the plaintiff's deliber-
ate act-is exceedingly doubtful. However, the second theory upon which the
case is decided involves a matter of general law; it discusses a tort problem in
concepts of causation and comparative degrees of negligence without first
' Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., suprc note 2; Scales v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., supra note io; 6 COOLEY, loc. cit. supra note
ii; Note (1928) 55 L. R. A. 549, at 552.
'Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Overton, 2o3 Ala. 193, 82 So. 443
(1919); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Robbs, 177 Ark. 275, 6 S. W. (2d) 52o
(1928) ; 6 COOLEY, loc. cit. supra note II.
10KLA. REV. LAWS (1921) §7970.
'Akers v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 6o N. W. 669 (1894) ; see
Cooper v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., I59 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o8).
'Kelly v. Muhs Co., 7i N. J. L. 358, 59 At. 23 (19o4).
* Conway v. Monidah Trust, 47 Mont. 269, 132 Pac. 26 (1913) ; Whitehead
Coal Mining Co. v. Pinkston, 71 Okla. I4, 175 Pac. 364 (918).
See 4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 176.
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establishing the existence of a duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Although a possessor of land is generally under no duty of care to prepare
it fdr the intrusion of a trespasser,' or to warn him of its dangerous condition,
2
it is acknowledged that certain duties arise toward constant trespassers within
a limited area. Thus, where the possessor creates a highly dangerous condition
upon the premises, of a nature that such trespassers will not discover it, he
must exercise reasonable care to warn them of the condition and the risk in-
volved.' In such case a prerequisite to liability is the inability of the "tolerated
intruder" reasonably to ascertain the extent of the danger himself. The
court in the principal case does not appear to have considered that the law
does not require a defendant to go through the idle ceremony of informing an-
other of that which the other will ascertain for himself. That the plaintiff's
negligence in such a situation as that of the instant case "was a mere condition
and not a contributing cause" of his injury is not only far-fetched, but imma-
terial, the defendant never having been negligent. Nevertheless, the court seems
to have fallen into this error; and desiring to substantiate its first theory of
recovery it had to resort to the doctrine that a trespassing plaintiff is not barred
from recovering against a "wanton. and willful" Wrongdoer' (even though the
jury was not consulted upon the point).' The application of the doctrine is some-
what doubtful in view of the passive conduct of the defendant, ' the defendant's
unawareness of the trespassing plaintiff's negligence," and the court's treatment
of gross negligence as synonymous with wanton misconduct.' Although it is
acknowledged that conduct designed to injure trespassers entails liability, it can
hardly be said that a condition of danger patent to a reasonable person is a
"trap" or "pitfall.' The very obviousness of the dangerous condition which
the court in the principal case labelled "wanton", is the element which removes
it from this category with reference to the plaintiff, it being its own message
'Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. I, 116 S. W. 557 (i9og); Dahl v. Valley Dredg-
ing Co., 125 Minn. 9o, 145 N. W. 796 (1914).
"vVeitzmann v. Barber Asphalt Co., i9o N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477 0907);
Central Georgia Power Co. v. Walker, 2o Ga. App. 645, 93 S. E. 3o6 (1918).
84 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 2o5; Burnett v.
Ft. Worth Light & Power Co., 117 S. WN". 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o9) ; Clark
v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255 Pac. 380 (1927); see
Hobbs v. Blanchard, 74 N. E. n16 (19o6).
'Bohlen, The Rule in British Coumbaz Railway Co. v. Loach (917) 66
U. OF PA. L. REv. 73, BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS (1926) 536.
"See Fox v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., 2o4 N. Y. 240, 97 N. E. 497
(1912) ; Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 192 N. C. 791, 136 S. E.
125 (1926).
'The Oklahoma rule is stated in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Ginn, 115 Okla. 76, 241
Pac. 794 (1925).
'See Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (908);
Young v. Worcester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N. E. 24 01925) ; cf. Louisville, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Orr, 121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35 (I898).
'Racine v. Morris, 2Ol N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864 (11I) ; McLaughlin v.
Bardsden, 5o Mont. 177, 145 Pac. 954 (1915).
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of warning to a reasonable person." The dictum with reference to the "at-
tractive nuisance' doctrine, expressly approving the dissenting opinion in United
Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt,' though inapplicable to the facts before the
court, is, however, a redeeming feature of a decision reaching a hardly justi-
fiable result.
PUSLIC SERVlCE COR'PORATIONs-PowER OF COURT TO MAxE RATs-Water
Company A supplied Water Company B, which in turn distributed to towns X.
On termination of the contracts between the respective parties, the Public
Utilities Commission made the rates considerably higher. X, and accordingly
B, refused to pay. On X's promise to pay any rate the court of equity might
determine to be reasonable, A was preliminarily restrained from turning off the
water. Before the final court hearing, the Commission satisfied the-parties by
fixing the future rate at a point midway between the former one and the old
contract price; however, X objected to this rate for the period of the contro-
versy. Held, that the Commission's rate for the future was reasonable, and that
the court would adopt this rate to measure X's debt for the past.*. Towit of
Kearney et al. v. New York & New Jersey Water Co. et al., 147 At. 8o5 (N. J.
1929).
The great weight of authority holds that a court cannot fix rates for the
future,1 on the theory that this is a legislative function.' However, this does
not preclude courts from declaring that a present rate, fixed by commission
or legislature, is invalid, if such rate is so low as to be confiscatory, i. e., a tak-
ing of property of the Public Service Corporation in violation of the "due
"Fox v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., supra note io; see Rodgers v. Lees,
140 Pa. 475, 21 Atl. 399 (i8gi).
1258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299 (I92I).
* The court further said that since the parties had submitted themselves to
the court of equity, they would be precluded from now complaining of its findings.
'Reagon v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct 1047
(1894) ; People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hale, 94 Ill. App. 4o6 (19oo) ; City
of Madison v. Madison Gas & Electric Co., 1f29 Wis. 249, io8 N. W. 65 (i9o6);
cf. In re Jarvin, 174 Mass. 514, 55 N. E. 381 (1898); Joline v. Wilcox, 194
N. Y. 383, 87 N. E. 517 (1909).2 Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct 48 (1913);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, 8o S. E.
913 (1914); REEDER, VALIDITY OF RATE REGULATION (1914) 107. It has been
urged that rate-fixing by a court is no more acting in futuro than is issuing
a mandatory injunction: REEDER, op. cit. supra at io8; Hardman, The Extent
of the Finality of Commission's Rate Regulationst (I92I) 28 W. VA. L. Q. iII,
119; nor than decreeing specific performance of a contract: Joline v. Wilcox,
supra note I, at 386, 87 N. E. at 517. The suggestion has been aptly made that
rate determination is really a combination of the three governmental functions,
viz, executive, legislative, and judicial. Hardman, op cit. supra, at 121. How-
ever, it is properly maintained that a court cannot act so efficiently in rate-
fixing as can a commission of experts devoting all their time specifically
thereto, People ex rel N. Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N. Y. 84, 113
N. E. 795 (1916); BEALE & WYMAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION (2d dd.
1915) § 1134.
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process" clause Although it seems the preferable view that the court in such
proceedings must limit itself to issues of law without questioning the Commis-
ion's finding of facts' the United States Supreme Court has taken the stand
that the court must review both law and facts in determining whether the rate
is confiscatory.' On the other hand it is held that a consumer cannot question
a rate in court,' on the theory that this cannot be a confiscation of his property,
and the rate set by the legislature is binding upon him, i. e., if his representatives
do not properly consider his interests his remedy is at the polls, not before the
court.7 But in the principal case there was really no problem of rate-fixing
before the court, although such language appears in the opinion.8 No question
of confiscation of property, or right of consumer to bring action appears, for
'Lake Shore, etc., Ry. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 19 Sup. Ct 565 (1899);
BLAcK CoNsTITTIoNAr. LAW (3d ed. 1910) 414; Collins, The Minnesota Rate
Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment (1914) 48 Am. L. REv. 27; see Martin,
Recent Federal Court Decisions Affecting State Laws Regulating Freight and
Passenger Rates (1911) 21 YA. L. J. 117, 121; NoYEs, AmERCAN RArLROAD
RATEs (1905) 212n. However, there was a period in American history when
courts hesitated to take any jurisdiction of rate questions, see McKeehan, Test-
ing Legislative Rate Rfgtlation under the Fourteenth Aendment, (igo8) PA.
BAR. REP. 5o6, 524.
'The United States Supreme Court declared that the court should not
interfere with commission's decree unless: (I) commission acted beyond its
power, statutory or constitutional, (2) the decree is based on mistake of law,
(3) rate is so low as to be taking of property-without due process of law,
(4) commission acted arbitrarily or unjustly contrary to or without sufficient
evidence, (5) authority involved was exercised so unreasonably that the rule
"the substance not the shadow determines the validity of the exercise of power"
applies, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541,
547, 32 Sup. Ct. 1O8, 11I (I91I).
'Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct.
527 (I919), rev'g the Pennsylvania decision which adopted the United States
Supreme Court rule expressed in note 4 supra, 260 Pa. 287, 1O3 Atl. 744 (1918).
The majority opinion did not mention Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union
Pacific R. R., supra note 4; but this case was one of the grounds of the three
dissenting judges. See article on the Ohio Valley Case: Curtis, Judicial Review
of C0111issiolns (1921) 34 HARV. L. Rxv. 862.
It has also been held that a court may determine the reasonableness of a
rate apart from "due process" clause. Guernsey, Principles Underlying Reayson-
able Rates (1927) 2 AA. L. J. 3, 5 and cases cited; McKeehan, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 511 and 52o; cf. REEDER, Op. cit. supra note 2, 227-228.
Griffith v. Water Works Co., 88 Miss. 371, 41 So. IOlI (19o6) ; Brooklyn
Union Gas Co. v. City of N. Y., 50 Misc. Rep. 450, IOO N. Y. Supp. 570 (I9O6),
aff'd 188 N. Y. 334, 8i N. E. 141 (io7); and Note thereon 15 L. R. A. (N. s.)
763; St Paul Book, etc., Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., supra note I; cf. Griffin
v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N. C. 206, 30 S. E. 319 (1898).
However, in New Jersey, the rate's "reasonableness as against the consumers
generally can . . . be called in question by the Supreme Court . . . by
-writ of certiorari." Woodruff v. East Orange, 71 N. J. Eq. 419, 422, 64
At. 466, 467 (19o6) ; also Collingswood v. Water-Supply Commission, 84 N. J.
L. 1O4, 86 Atl. 66o (1913).
IBrooklyn Union Gas Co. v. City of N. Y. snpra note 6 (in lower court
decision).
8 47 At. 867.
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the parties were satisfied with the future rate set by the Commission. The only
issue presented was what debt X owed for water furnished in the past, and
exercising a long-settled judicial function, the court fixed reasonable damages.
TAXATION-RECOVERY OF TAXES PAID WITHOUT PROTEST UNDER A STATUTE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Kentucky statute1 provided that wherever "It
shall appear . . . that money has been paid for taxes . . . where no such taxes
are due" there shall be a right to a refund of the amount so paid. Plaintiff
paid taxes under a statute which had been held constitutional by the state courts.
Subsequently the Supreme Court of the United States held the taxing statute
unconstitutional. Plaintiff now sues to recover back the taxes so paid. Held,
that as the taxes were voluntarily paid, there can be no recovery. Coleman v.
Inland Gas Corporatiom, 21 S. W. (2d) io30 (1929).
At common law it was well settled that taxes voluntarily paid,' though in
fact not due, could not be recovered in the absence of some protest or notice
that the payment was disputed.2 There is nothing in the nature of the problem,
however, to prevent a statutory modification of the rule, and accordingly several
states have done this.' Moreover it has been held that the common law rule has
been abrogated, and the necessity for involuntary payment abolished, under stat-
utes which contain no more specific a provision than that present in the instant
case.! The theory of the court would seem to be that the state having relied
upon the probable income from taxation in providing for expenditures, it would
be unjust to allow it to be deprived of such sums in the absence of some notifi-
cation that the payment was disputed. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion'
this hardship is chimerical, for even though notice were given the funds are
used and not set aside to await a judicial determination of the question. Ad-
mittedly no taxes were due, regardless of what effect the statute might be given
before it was declared unconstitutional, or there could be no recovery of the
taxes even had notice been given. Nor can the sanction, which the doctrine that
ignorance of the law is no excuse has so often received, avail in the face of
'Act of February 27, 1893. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, ig) § 162.
"'As to what constitutes voluntary payment, see Note, (1911) 7 COL. L. REv.
6oi.
Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. 73 (1858) ; Richardson v. Denver, 17
Colo. 398, 30 Pac. 333 (1892) ; Otis v. People, i96 Ill. 542, 63 N. E. 1053 (19o2);
COOLLY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1282 and § 1294.
'CaWFRD AND MosE's DIGEST OF Aax. STAT. (1921) § ioiSo; CAL.
POLITICAL CODE (1923) § 3804a; IOWA CODE (I919) § 4602; GEN. LAwS MASS.,
c. 63, §78; MIss. CODE (i906), §4346, see also HEMMINGWAY'S ANNOTATED
CODE (1917) §698o; VA. CODE (1919) § 2389.
' Stewart v. County of Alameda, I42 Cal. 660, 76 Pac. 481 (904) ; Jackson
Hill Coal and Coke Co. v. Board of Commissioners, I81 Ind. 335, 104 N. E. 497
(1914); Commercial National Bank v. Board of Supervisors, I68 Iowa 5oi,
i5o N. W. 754 (915) ; Smith v. Tenn. C. I. & R. Co., i92 Ala. 129, 68 So.
865 (915) ; see also, Indianapolis v. Morris, 25 Ind. App. 4o9 (i9oo) ; People
v. Board of Supervisors, 5i N. Y. 442 (1873); and see Note, iz VA. L. REv.
433 (925-26).
'See the instant case, cited in text, at 1034.
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a statute which unqualifiedly states that taxes not due shall be refunded. The
tendency of decisions like that reached in the principal case would seem to be
to discourage prompt and unconditional payment of taxes, and on the whole an
opposite result would be more desirable. The holding however may be supported
upon the peculiar facts of the case. A prior and similar statute of the same
state' had been construed in accordance with the instant decision by a long line
of cases. The instant statute was in substance a re-enactment of the former
statute but had been construed differently.' Though it was necessary to overrule
the cases in which it had been so construed, it is submitted that this was cor-
rectly done" under the theory that the legislature by re-enacting the prior
statute thereby adopted the construction which the court had previously
declared."
IAct 1854, c. 848.
'City of Louisville v. Anderson, 79 Ky. 334, (1882) ; L. & N. R. R. Co. v.
Hopkins, 87 Ky. 6o5, 9 S. W. 497 (1889) ; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth,
89 Ky. 531, 12 S. W. or14 (1892).
'Craig v. Frankfort Distilling Co., 189 Ky. 616, 225 S. W. 73 (1920), but
in doing so the court overruled Greene v. Taylor, 184 Ky. 739, 211 S. W. 925
(igig) which had adopted the construction of the cases cited mtpra note 8.
" But on the question as to whether the payment in the instant case was
voluntary, cf. with the decision Oakland Cemetery Association v. Ramsay
County, 98 Minn. 404, io8 N. W. 857 (i9o6), and see further Gage v. City of
Saginaw, 128 Mich. 682, 84 N. W. ILoo, rev'd, 87 N. W. io27 (igoi).
'Greene v. Louisville Ry. Co., 184 Ky. 9o, 211 S. W. 418 (1919) ; People
v. Ill. Cent Ry., 314 Ill. 373, 145 N. E. 731 (1924); Spitzer v. Stillings,
1O9 Ohio St 297, 142 N. E. 365 (1924) ; 2 SUTaHLANI, STATUTORY CoNsaRuc-
TiON (2d ed. 19o4) § 399.
